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Abstract—Interesting wireless networking scenarios exist 
wherein network services must be guaranteed in a dynamic 
fashion for some priority users. For example, in disaster recovery, 
members need to be able to quickly block other users in order to 
gain sole use of the radio channel.  As it is not always feasible to 
physically switch off other users, we propose a new approach, 
termed selective packet destruction (SPD) to ensure service for 
priority users. A testbed for SPD has been created, based on the 
Rice University Wireless open-Access Research Platform and been 
used to examine the feasibility of our approach. Results from the 
testbed are presented to demonstrate the feasibility of SPD and 
show how a balance between performance and acknowledgement 
destruction rate can be achieved. A 90% reduction in TCP & UDP 
traffic is achieved for a 75% MAC ACK destruction rate. 
 
Index terms: Network Security, Implementation, Denial of 
Service, Network Management 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Guaranteed communication services are important for some 
critical applications such as disaster recovery, law enforcement, 
and battle field communications etc. However, it is especially 
difficult to guarantee this, as radio is often the only means of 
communication in these scenarios. Typically, multiple wireless 
networks may exist in the same geographical area competing for 
bandwidth on the same channel. A network administrator may 
be able to limit the users on the wireless network for which they 
are responsible, but not on other wireless networks beyond its 
control. If the administrator tries to block a channel, then 
generally no-one can communicate over it, including the 
priority users. We propose a selective packet destruction (SPD) 
solution to address this dilemma, which can also be used as 
either an attack tool [1-2], or a network management tool for 
network regulation. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
presents a brief review of the existing work in this area. Section 
3 elaborates the details of selective packet destruction attack 
and its applications; this is followed by a description of the SPD 
implementation in Section 4 and the experiments in Section 5. 
The conclusions are given in Section 6.   
II. RELATED WORK 
Selective packet destruction can be considered as a type of 
jamming and has been used as an effective Denial of Service 
(DoS) attack in various scenarios. We can categorise jamming 
attacks into two basic strategies: proactive and reactive. 
Proactive jamming constantly blocks one or more channels by 
transmitting noises or packets continuously, i.e. permanently 
occupying the target channels. The disadvantages of this type of 
attack are that it is energy demanding and it can be easily 
detected. Reactive jamming on the other hand, does not 
constantly transmit. Instead, it transmits only when needed, 
based on its own discretion and attack strategies and  therefore 
is considered to be more intelligent. With advanced strategies, it 
can be designed to be energy efficient and hard to detect. Patel 
et al. [1] carried out a survey on attacks against wireless sensor 
networks including jamming attacks and countermeasures.  
Pelechrinis et al. [8] reviewed jamming attacks in wireless 
networks. 
A reactive jamming attack, Jamming ACK (JACK), was 
investigated by Zhang et al. [1]. JACK targets IEEE 802.11 
DCF networks wherein an attacker transmits wireless signals to 
jam (corrupt) ACK messages in order to force the data 
transmitter to retransmit the data packet. They demonstrated, by 
network simulations, that a wireless network could be easily 
disrupted by the JACK attack.  
In order to mitigate the adverse effects of jamming attacks, 
various countermeasures have been proposed. A counter- 
measure, termed Extended NAV (ENAV), was proposed to 
inhibit the above mentioned JACK attack. It extends the length 
of an ACK timeout to let the ACK be transmitted at a random 
time slot to reduce the chance of it being destroyed by the JACK 
attack. While this scheme improves the resilience, it reduces the 
efficiency of the MAC protocol and may have implications for 
other aspects. For example, the ENAV mechanism may be 
exploited by a malicious attacker or a selfish node to 
intentionally change the ENAV in order to disrupt the network 
or to gain unfair access to the network resource. 
In [1], a countermeasure, Random Backoff Control (RBC), 
against malicious behaviour in WLANs was proposed. The aim 
of RBC is to assure network resources are fairly distributed 
among network users by regulating the backoff selection 
process.  
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In [1], a Trust Management Framework (TMF) using grey 
theory and Fuzzy sets was proposed to assess the trustiness of 
node behaviour. Since multiple network parameters are used for 
assessment, the TMF is claimed to have high efficiency in 
detection of misbehaviours and can be used in conjunction with 
other regulation algorithms. 
The contribution of this paper is in the practical 
implementation of a reactive jamming attack called the SPD 
which acts against the MAC ACKs, thus validating the practical 
feasibility of such an attack. We also propose a novel 
application of this type of attack to regulate network usage. To 
our best knowledge, this is the first time that such an SDP attack 
has actually been implemented and demonstrated on a real 
application.   
III. SELECTIVE PACKET DESTRUCTION (SPD) 
A. Problem Statement 
Consider the scenario illustrated in Fig. 1. An AP provides a 
network service to users A and B. User A is a priority user while 
B is an ordinary user. A moderator monitors and regulates the 
network usage of each user. In an emergency situation, user A 
should be guaranteed to use the network service while user B 
can have only limited network usage. This network policy is 
enforced by the network moderator. 
 To reduce the bandwidth usage of user B, the Moderator will 
look for data packets from and to user B. Following each data 
packet, an MAC ACK frame is expected to be transmitted after 
a SIFS (short inter-frame space). Based on its observation, the 
Moderator will decide if it needs to kill that ACK frame. If yes, 
it will transmit a short packet to destroy the ACK on the fly. 
Consequently user B will either back off or retransmit the 
original data packet, as described in section 3. 
B. Network Model 
The network type is one of the following types namely 
wireless LANs, wireless ad hoc networks, wireless mesh 
networks, and mobile multi-hop wireless networks. The 
principle can also be applied to other wireless networks wherein 
users communicate to each other via broadcast media, adopting 
the MAC ACK mechanism, i.e. each MAC data frame must be 
acknowledged by a MAC ACK for the confirmation of 
successful receipt. 
C. SPD Model 
There are numerous ways to destroy selected packets on the 
fly; the most intuitive approach is to transmit noise to collide 
with packet signals, but the attacker must know the packet ID or 
MAC address of the sender or receiver of the packet when it is 
transmitted. The first aspect can be determined through the 
Carrier Sense (CS) which is available for most wireless 
chipsets, however, knowledge of the packet ID or MAC address 
is difficult to acquire in advance, as it cannot be predicted when 
an unwanted packet will be transmitted. This knowledge has to 
be extracted while the packet is in transmission. As soon as the 
packet ID has been extracted, the moderator will determine if it 
is an unwanted packet and will then transmit some noise signals 
to destroy the remaining on-going packet transmission.  
This presents challenges as the moderator has to respond 
quickly enough to transmit the noise before the on-going packet 
transmission finishes. Currently, Wi-Fi data rates have reached 
1.3Gbps (IEEE802.11ac) over a single channel using 
off-the-shelf commercial products which requires less than 1s 
to transmit 1000 bits. Thus, the moderator needs to be highly 
efficient at bit stream decoding, processing, and state transition 
which represents the process from receiving state to 
transmitting state when a single radio is used. 
An alternative approach involves prediction of the 
forthcoming packet transmission based on previous packet 
transmissions. Since the wireless medium is unreliable, most 
wireless MAC protocols implement a MAC acknowledgement 
mechanism to confirm the correct reception of a data frame, 
and/or a virtual carrier sense mechanism to reserve the medium. 
A MAC data frame will be re-transmitted for a pre-specified 
maximum number of times before it is dropped if its MAC 
acknowledgement is never received. One can predict a MAC 
ACK based on a received MAC data frame and kill it. This may 
not be as effective as the direct data packet destruction since the 
actual data frame is not destructed; however it might be energy 
efficient as it only needs to transmit a very short noise packet 
whose length is related to the ACK’s length.  
In the case of virtual carrier sense being used, a data packet is 
transmitted following the successful exchange of RTS (Request 
to Send) and CTS (Clear to Send). The transmission sequence is 
RTS, CTS, DATA, and ACK. One can predict a CTS signal 
based on a received RTS, a DATA based on a received CTS, 
and an ACK based on a received DATA. In this scenario, one 
can choose to destroy either CTS, or DATA, or ACK frames. 
In this paper, we chose to use this model to selectively 
destroy MAC ACKs. We implemented the SPD on the Wireless 
Open-Access Research Platform (WARP) platform [3] and Fig. 
2 illustrates the work flow of the SPD process of our 
implementation. The moderator keeps monitoring the wireless 
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Fig. 1. Application Scenario 
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media; whenever it receives a packet header it will check the 
header information against the criteria to see if it matches the 
pre-defined destruction rules such as frame source /destination 
addresses, frame type, bandwidth occupied by the source 
/destination, signal strength and variation, etc. If the criteria are 
matched, the moderator will then transmit a short noise packet 
when the medium becomes busy again in order to destroy the 
expected ACK response from the receiver. 
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Fig. 2. SPD Work Flow 
IV. PROTOTYPING AND EXPERIMENT SETUP  
      In order to investigate these approaches, the use of the 
WARP v3 [8] was adopted as it allows the alteration of the 
physical layer although for these experiments, only the 
moderator MAC layer was altered. WARP v3 integrates a high 
performance FPGA including a MicroBlaze processor, two 
flexible RF interfaces and multiple peripherals to allow rapid 
customisation of wireless designs. The initial implementation of 
SPD based on WARP OFDM reference design, is given below. 
A. WARP OFDM Reference Design 
    Fig. 3 shows the WARP OFDM Reference Design which 
implements a real-time network stack on a WARP node. The 
design includes a MIMO OFDM physical layer and flexible 
MAC interface for building custom protocols. The OFDM 
reference design employed a simplified Carrier-Sense Medium 
Access (CSMA) protocol which encompasses much of the 
behaviour of the commercial IEEE 802.11 MAC/PHY chipsets. 
This algorithm lends itself nicely to a state diagram which can 
be run on the MicroBlaze of the WARP FPGA; the source code 
for this is on the WARP website [3]. 
 
MicroBlaze 
Code
 
 
Fig. 3. WARP OFDM Reference Design Structure 
 
    For this MAC algorithm, only two types of packets are 
defined and can be loaded into the MAC frame and understood 
by the receiver, DATA or ACK. The data packet flag tells the 
receiving node that a payload is present in this packet and must 
be delivered via the Ethernet connection to some connected 
device; it will also send an ACK frame to the transmitting node. 
If it is an ACK, the node must have been in a timeout waiting on 
an acknowledgment. It will clear the timeout and return to the 
idle state. 
The WARP MAC employs a retransmission and backoff 
mechanism which is equivalent to that of the IEEE 802.11 
MAC. A data frame will be re-transmitted until it reaches the 
maximum number of retransmissions, namely n. The default 
value of n is 8 which can be changed and the maximum back-off 
window size is 2n+4-1. 
B. Experiment Setup and Prototyping Validation 
  Implementation involved coding in C to add the 
functionality of SPD shown in Fig. 2 into the WARP MAC 
source. As depicted in Fig. 4, a testbed was set up with two PCs 
and three WARP nodes (A, B and Moderator); each PC is 
connected via a wired Ethernet connection to a WARP node. 
Each packet received at the WARP node’s Ethernet interface is 
encapsulated in the WARP’s simplified CSMA/CA protocol 
and transmitted over the air to the other WARP node. Every 
data frame that is received wirelessly is sent to the WARP 
node’s Ethernet interface, this allows the PCs to communicate 
via Ethernet over the wireless bridge. Tools used included Iperf 
 4 
(to generate TCP and UDP traffic), PuTTY (to collect packet 
delivery statistics), and Wireshark (to record network traffic for 
further inspection). 
The verification of the SPD attack involves two stages. 
Firstly, the packet statistics are checked to ensure that only the 
MAC-ACK frames are destroyed i.e. no MAC-DATA frames 
lost due to attack, and also that the amount of MAC-ACK 
frames lost due to the attack is equal to the desired attack rate. 
This is accomplished by processing the statistics of DATA 
frames sent/received and MAC frames sent/received on Nodes 
A and B. 
The second part of verification is to assess the impact that the 
attack has on the throughput of the link, with the aim of 
reducing throughput as the attack rate is increased. The network 
performance measurement tool iperf is used to generate TCP 
and UDP data streams and report the bandwidth between the 
PCs. All validating experiments were taken with no moderator 
active to get a baseline for the performance.  
V. EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
    The testbed uses five pieces of equipment: three WARP v3 
boards and two desktop PCs as in Fig. 4. Each PC connects to a 
WARP board through an Ethernet cable. One WARP board acts 
as the Moderator. The Moderator constantly monitors the 
channel and destroys forthcoming ACKs when the criteria are 
met. Extensive experiments were carried out with various 
parameters such as different packet sizes and MAC ACK 
destruction rates. Due to space limitation, we only present part 
of the experiment results here. 
A. Attack Performance 
    Prototyping faces more challenges than simulation. In a real 
environment, there are many uncertainties, each of which may 
affect experiment results. Fig. 5 illustrates the change in MAC 
ACK loss rate for both TCP and UDP traffic as the attack rate 
varies. It can be observed that the ACK loss rate shows a strong 
correlation with attack rate until it reaches 75%. Beyond this 
point, the ACK loss rate decreases while the attack rate 
increases. This might be due to the restraint of the hardware 
capability, e.g. processing power, timing, etc. In order to 
destroy a MAC ACK frame, the Moderator needs to detect the 
packet transmission, match the criteria, and quickly change its 
state from receiving to transmitting. The SPD matching code is 
running in a MicroBlaze CPU clocked at 160 MHz which is 
relatively slow compared with the CPU frequency of modern 
radio chipsets. The attack performance might be improved via 
code optimization; however, Fig. 5 has shown that it is feasible 
to selectively destroy frames based on the WARP v3 platform. 
 
 
Fig. 5 Attack Rate vs ACK Loss Rate in Two Series of Attacks 
B. TCP Performance 
    Fig. 6 shows the TCP throughput under SPD attacks, which 
target only MAC ACKs in one direction (Node B - Node A). 
We can see that the TCP throughput decreases with a strong 
correlation to the MAC ACK loss rate increasing, which means 
more bandwidth is released. When the MAC ACK loss rate 
reaches 75%, the reduced throughput (i.e. 1-TCP throughput) 
reaches nearly 90%. In this way, a large amount of released 
bandwidth can be used by priority users. It can also be observed 
that the TCP packet size change does not have significant 
impact on the attack performance. 
Moderator
MAC ADDR 
00:08
Node A
MAC ADDR 
00:00 Omni 
Directional 
Antenna 
Ethernet 
Connection
Ethernet 
Connection
IP Address
10.0.0.1
Subnet Mask
255.0.0.0
IP Address
10.0.0.2
Subnet Mask
255.0.0.0
Node B
MAC ADDR 
00:01
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Experimental Setup 
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It has been shown that a TCP packet loss rate of 20% can 
effectively bring down a TCP connection [1]. It is different in 
the SPD model. SPD kills MAC ACKs with a certain 
probability but data frames are not directly targeted. So, the 
TCP packet loss rate is not affected in SPD since TCP DATA 
and TCP ACK can be sent to the other end without problems. 
This has been observed in the experiment results. SPD 
significantly increases the interval between two consecutive 
TCP segments, which slows down the TCP link. 
 
                  Fig. 6 TCP Throughput versus MAC ACK Loss Rate 
 
C. UDP Performance 
    Fig. 7 presents the UDP maximum changes under single 
direction (Node B - Node A) SPD MAC ACK attacks. The 
performance changes are very similar to that of TCP as shown 
in Fig. 6. 
 
Fig. 7 Maximum UDP Throughput under Attacks 
    For UDP, delay and jitter are important performance 
parameters. Since the two communicating nodes are not 
synchronized, we are not able to measure the delay 
performance. Fig. 8 shows the jitter changes when MAC ACK 
loss rate increases. It can be observed that when the ACK loss 
rate increases to 50%, the jitter rapidly increases. Beyond this 
point, the number of retransmissions of a UDP packet may vary 
greatly and this will lead to large uncertainties in the delay 
between two consecutive UDP packets, i.e. large jitter. The 
jitter is slightly larger for bigger size packets. This is due to the 
packet transmission delay contribution to the jitter. 
    Other experiments show similar effects of SPD attacks and 
again demonstrate how this type of attacks can effectively 
reduce a link’s bandwidth. 
 
Fig. 8 UDP Jitter under Attacks 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
  We have presented and implemented the Selective Packet 
Destruction (SPD) attack on WARP v3 platform and applied it 
to regulate network traffic so that priority users can be 
guaranteed to use network resources in certain circumstances 
such as in disaster recovery and law enforcement. Experiments 
have demonstrated the feasibility of implementation of SPD 
attack, and its effectiveness in regulating network traffic.   
Future research directions include a theoretical analysis of 
SPD efficiency, establishment of the relationship between the 
attack rate and the actual released bandwidth, and comparison 
of the efficiencies of different attack strategies. 
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